New Attacks on Deep Learning Using Micro-architectural Vulnerabilities
No. Our research is focused on exposing and characterizing the vulnerabilities of deep learning models, especially deep neural networks (DNNs), caused by hardware attacks. We first expose that DNNs are vulnerable to bitwise corruptions that are facilitated by a prominent RowHammer attack which can trigger a random or targeted bit-flip in physical memory . Second, we show that a motivated adversary can reverse-engineer DNNs and steal the potentially proprietary network architectures, by leveraging a small amount of information leaked by a cache side-channel attack, Flush+Reload [2, 3]. As it becomes a widespread practice for researchers and engineers to outsource the training and deployment of their deep learning models to cloud-based services (e.g., MLaaS) or to use special hardware for acceleration, we believe our research has taken the first step toward understanding the impact of new, imminent threats to deep learning models (DNNs) deployed and running in the real-world.
03.2020: We released the
source code used in our ICLR'20 paper!
12.2019: Our "How to 0wn NAS in Your Spare Time" paper is accepted in ICLR'20!
08.2019: Our "Terminal Brain Damage" paper is presented in USENIX'19!
05.2019: Our paper on "Terminal Brain Damage" is accepted in USENIX'19!
10.2018: We released the preprint of our research on reconstructing DNN architectures using cache side-channel attack in arXiv.
Our research found that the leakage extracted from a cache side-channel attack, Flush+Reload, while a DNN model is processing a single sample, contains a lot of information about the architecture details. Here, we design a novel algorithm that reconstructs the victim DNN’s architecture from the leakage accurately...
Our research found that a specific bit-flip in a DNN’s bitwise representation can cause the accuracy loss up to 90%, and the DNN has 40-50% parameters, on average, that can lead to the accuracy drop over 10% when individually subjected to such single bitwise corruptions...
 Sanghyun Hong, Michael Davinroy, Yiǧitcan Kaya,
Dana Dachman-Soled, and Tudor Dumitraş. How to 0wn NAS in Your Spare Time.
In 8th International Conference on Learning Representation (ICLR). Virtual. Apr. 26 - May 2, 2020.
 Sanghyun Hong, Pietro Frigo, Yiǧitcan Kaya, Cristiano Giuffrida, and Tudor Dumitraş. Terminal Brain Damage: Exposing the Graceless Degradation in Deep Neural Networks Under Hardware Fault Attacks. In 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX). Santa Clara, CA. Aug. 14-16, 2019. [PDF]
 Sanghyun Hong*, Michael Davinroy*, Yiǧitcan Kaya, Stuart Nevans Locke, Ian Rackow, Kevin Kulda, Dana Dachman-Soled, Tudor Dumitraş. Security Analysis of Deep Neural Network Operating in the Presence of Cache Side-Channel Attacks. Preprint in arXiv. Oct. 8, 2018. [PDF] (* indicates equal contribution)
Sanghyun Hong (PhD Student, University of Maryland College Park)
Pietro Frigo (PhD Student, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Yigitcan Kaya (PhD Student, University of Maryland College Park)
Michael Davinroy (PhD Student, Northeastern University)
Tudor Dumitras (Associate Professor, University of Maryland College Park)
Cristiano Giuffrida (Assistant Professor, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Dana Dachman-Soled (Assistant Professor, University of Maryland College Park)