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; Submit by logging into grace.umd.edu and using the following command:
; 	submit 2014 fall enee 757 0101 6 my_file.bib
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; Required Readings

@INPROCEEDINGS{ Sherwood05,
  title =	 {Misbehaving {TCP} receivers can cause internet-wide
                  congestion collapse},
  author =	 {Rob Sherwood and Bobby Bhattacharjee and Ryan Braud},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the 12th {ACM} Conference on Computer
                  and Communications Security, {CCS} 2005, Alexandria,
                  VA, USA, November 7-11, 2005},
  bdsk-url-2 =	 {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1102120.1102170},
  bibsource =	 {dblp computer science bibliography, http://dblp.org},
  timestamp =	 {Thu, 18 Sep 2014 12:18:37 +0200},
  url =		 {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1102120.1102170},
  biburl =
                  {http://dblp.uni-trier.de/rec/bib/conf/ccs/SherwoodBB05},
  doi =		 {10.1145/1102120.1102170},
  crossref =	 {DBLP:conf/ccs/2005},
  abstract =	 {An optimistic acknowledgment (opt-ack) is an
                  acknowledgment sent by a misbehaving client for a
                  data segment that it has not received. Whereas
                  previous work has focused on opt-ack as a means to
                  greedily improve end-to-end performance, we study
                  opt-ack exclusively as a denial of service
                  attack. Specifically, an attacker sends optimistic
                  acknowledgments to many victims in parallel, thereby
                  amplifying its effective bandwidth by a factor of 30
                  million (worst case). Thus, even a relatively modest
                  attacker can totally saturate the paths from many
                  victims back to the attacker. Worse, a distributed
                  network of compromised machines (zombies) attacking
                  in parallel can exploit over-provisioning in the
                  Internet to bring about wide-spread, sustained
                  congestion collapse.We implement this attack both in
                  simulation and in a wide-area network, and show it
                  severity both in terms of number of packets and
                  total traffic generated. We engineer and implement a
                  novel solution that does not require client or
                  network modifications allowing for practical
                  deployment. Additionally, we demonstrate the
                  solution's efficiency on a real network.},
  year =	 {2005},
  pages =	 {383--392},
  studentfirstname ="",
  studentlastname ="",
  summary =	 "",
  contribution1 ="",
  contribution2 ="",
  contribution3 ="",
  contribution4 ="",
  contribution5 ="",
  weakness1 =	 "",
  weakness2 =	 "",
  weakness3 =	 "",
  weakness4 =	 "",
  weakness5 =	 "",
  interesting =	 "high/med/low",
  opinions =	 "",
}


; BibTex cross-references (don't add anything here)

@PROCEEDINGS{ DBLP:conf/ccs/2005,
  title =	 {Proceedings of the 12th {ACM} Conference on Computer
                  and Communications Security, {CCS} 2005, Alexandria,
                  VA, USA, November 7-11, 2005},
  bibsource =	 {dblp computer science bibliography, http://dblp.org},
  timestamp =	 {Thu, 18 Sep 2014 12:18:37 +0200},
  editor =	 {Vijay Atluri and Catherine Meadows and Ari Juels},
  isbn =	 {1-59593-226-7},
  publisher =	 {{ACM}},
  biburl =	 {http://dblp.uni-trier.de/rec/bib/conf/ccs/2005},
  year =	 {2005},
}