



# College of Information Studies

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## Encryption

Session 9

INST 346

# Simple encryption scheme

*substitution cipher*: substituting one thing for another

- monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another

plaintext:	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z
ciphertext:	m	n	b	v	c	x	z	a	s	d	f	g	h	j	k	l	p	o	i	u	y	t	r	e	w	q

e.g.: Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice  
ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc

🔑 *Encryption key*: mapping from set of 26 letters  
to set of 26 letters

# Stream and Block Ciphers

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- $n$  substitution ciphers,  $M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n$
- cycling pattern:
  - e.g.,  $n=4$ :  $M_1, M_3, M_4, M_3, M_2$ ;  $M_1, M_3, M_4, M_3, M_2$ ; ..
  - random initialization
- for each new plaintext symbol, use subsequent substitution pattern in cyclic pattern
  - dog: d from  $M_1$ , o from  $M_3$ , g from  $M_4$



**Encryption key:**  $n$  substitution ciphers, and cyclic pattern

# AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

- symmetric-key NIST standard, replaced DES (Nov 2001)
- processes data in 128 bit blocks
- 128, 192, or 256 bit keys
- brute force decryption (try each key) taking 1 sec on DES, takes 149 trillion years for AES

# Public Key Cryptography




## *symmetric key crypto*

- requires sender, receiver know shared secret key
- Q: how to agree on key in first place (particularly if never “met”)?

## *public key crypto*

- radically different approach [Diffie-Hellman76, RSA78]
- sender, receiver do *not* share secret key
- *public* encryption key known to *all*
- *private* decryption key known only to receiver

# Public key cryptography



# Public key encryption algorithms

requirements:

- ① need  $K_B^+(\cdot)$  and  $K_B^-(\cdot)$  such that

$$K_B^-(K_B^+(m)) = m$$

- ② given public key  $K_B^+$ , it should be impossible to compute private key  $K_B^-$

**RSA:** Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm

# RSA: Creating public/private key pair

1. choose two large prime numbers  $p, q$ .  
(e.g., 1024 bits each)
2. compute  $n = pq$ ,  $z = (p-1)(q-1)$
3. choose  $e$  (with  $e < n$ ) that has no common factors with  $z$  ( $e, z$  are “relatively prime”).
4. choose  $d$  such that  $ed-1$  is exactly divisible by  $z$ .  
(in other words:  $ed \bmod z = 1$ ).
5. public key is  $\underbrace{(n, e)}_{K_B^+}$ . private key is  $\underbrace{(n, d)}_{K_B^-}$ .



# RSA: encryption, decryption

0. given  $(n,e)$  and  $(n,d)$  as computed above

1. to encrypt message  $m$  ( $<n$ ), compute

$$c = m^e \bmod n$$

2. to decrypt received bit pattern,  $c$ , compute

$$m = c^d \bmod n$$

$$m = \underbrace{(m^e \bmod n)}_c^d \bmod n$$


# RSA example:

Bob chooses  $p=5$ ,  $q=7$ . Then  $n=35$ ,  $z=24$ .

$e=5$  (so  $e$ ,  $z$  relatively prime).

$d=29$  (so  $ed-1$  exactly divisible by  $z$ ).

encrypting 8-bit messages.



# RSA: an important property

$$\underbrace{K_B^-(K_B^+(m))}_{\text{use public key first, followed by private key}} = m = \underbrace{K_B^+(K_B^-(m))}_{\text{use private key first, followed by public key}}$$

use public key first,  
followed by  
private key

use private key  
first, followed by  
public key

*result is the same!*

# Why is RSA secure?

- suppose you know Bob's public key  $(n,e)$ . How hard is it to determine  $d$ ?
- essentially need to find factors of  $n$  without knowing the two factors  $p$  and  $q$ 
  - fact: factoring a big number is hard

# RSA in practice: session keys

- exponentiation in RSA is computationally intensive
- DES is at least 100 times faster than RSA
- use public key crypto to establish secure connection, then establish second key – symmetric session key – for encrypting data

## *session key, $K_S$*

- Bob and Alice use RSA to exchange a symmetric key  $K_S$
- once both have  $K_S$ , they use symmetric key cryptography

# Digital signatures


cryptographic technique analogous to hand-written signatures:

- sender (Bob) digitally signs document, establishing he is document owner/creator.
- *verifiable, nonforgeable*: recipient (Alice) can prove to someone that Bob, and no one else (including Alice), must have signed document

# Digital signatures

simple digital signature for message  $m$ :

- Bob signs  $m$  by encrypting with his private key  $K_B^-$ , creating “signed” message,  $K_B^-(m)$



In practice, this is done more efficiently on message digests

# Digital signatures

- suppose Alice receives msg  $m$ , with signature:  $m, K_B^-(m)$
- Alice verifies  $m$  signed by Bob by applying Bob's public key  $K_B$  to  $K_B^-(m)$  then checks  $K_B(K_B^-(m)) = m$ .
- If  $K_B(K_B^-(m)) = m$ , whoever signed  $m$  must have used Bob's private key.

Alice thus verifies that:

- Bob signed  $m$
- no one else signed  $m$
- Bob signed  $m$  and not  $m'$

non-repudiation:


- ✓ Alice can take  $m$ , and signature  $K_B^-(m)$  to court and prove that Bob signed  $m$



# Message digests

*goal:* fixed-length, easy-to-compute digital “fingerprint”

- apply hash function  $H$  to  $m$ , get fixed size message digest,  $H(m)$ .



## Hash function properties:

- many-to-1
- produces fixed-size msg digest (fingerprint)
- given message digest  $x$ , computationally infeasible to find  $m$  such that  $x = H(m)$

# TCP checksum: poor crypto hash function

Internet checksum has some properties of hash function:

- produces fixed length digest (16-bit sum) of message
- is many-to-one

But given message with given hash value, it is easy to find another message with same hash value:

<u>message</u>	<u>ASCII format</u>		<u>message</u>	<u>ASCII format</u>
I O U 1	49 4F 55 31		I O U <u>9</u>	49 4F 55 <u>39</u>
0 0 . 9	30 30 2E 39		0 0 . <u>1</u>	30 30 2E <u>31</u>
9 B O B	39 42 D2 42		9 B O B	39 42 D2 42
	<u>B2 C1 D2 AC</u>	different messages but identical checksums!		<u>B2 C1 D2 AC</u>

# Widely used hash functions

- MD5 (RFC 1321) has known vulnerabilities
  - computes 128-bit message digest in 4-step process
- SHA-1 is widely used but is deprecated
  - US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1]
  - 160-bit message digest
  - Collision attack with 1000 GPUs in a month
- SHA-2 and SHA-3 are now available
  - Also standardized by NIST
  - More secure, but slower (in software)

# Before You Go

On a sheet of paper, answer the following (ungraded) question (no names, please):

What was the muddiest point in today's class?