


# Lunar Module

INST 154


Apollo at 50

# Agenda

- Lunar Module
- Apollo Spacesuit
- Risk Management
- (Discussion groups)
- Case study papers












LMI SIMULATOR









LUNAR CONTACT

X-POINTER SCANNING


BRIGHT

EXTERIOR TRACK

1605 52

10. FUEL  
11. AIR  
12. OXYGEN  
13. WATER  
14. FOOD  
15. MEDICAL  
16. TOOLS  
17. EQUIPMENT  
18. COMMUNICATIONS  
19. NAVIGATION  
20. WEATHER  
21. THERMAL CONTROL  
22. LIFE SUPPORT  
23. SAFETY  
24. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES  
25. ESCAPE  
26. REPAIRS  
27. MAINTENANCE  
28. INSPECTIONS  
29. RECORDS  
30. LOGS

MAGAZINE







FLIGHT DATA FILE

L. YOUNG

**NASA SKYLAB RECHECK**

1. PLS ASK AG - ON
2. CONNECT WIRE TO PLS AG 200A
3. WAVE WAVE - ON
4. UN PLS AG - ON
5. CONNECT WIRE TO PLS AG 200A  
KEEP CONNECTED ALONG TIME  
AND LIGHT BLANK
6. PLS FOR 5 MINUTES
7. CONNECT WIRE TO PLS PINE WIRE  
FOR 5 MINUTES
8. CONNECT WIRE TO PLS AG 200A  
FOR 5 MINUTES
9. WAVE WAVE - OFF
10. PLS AG 200A - OFF
11. DISCONNECT WIRE FROM WAVE WAVE





# Learning as You Go

- Seats?
  - Too heavy, too far from the windows
- Forward docking port?
  - Too small to exit with a PLSS backpack
- Fuel cells?
  - Too late
- Descent engine throttling
  - Parallel development, but both worked
- Ascent engine injector
  - No parallel development until 1967, but it was needed!

# Subcontracted LM Components

## **CALIFORNIA (56)**

Abort Electronics Assembly  
Absolute and Differential Pressure Transducers  
Absolute Pressure Switch  
Actuator Bellows Assembly  
Air Filter  
Ambient Helium Tanks  
Ascent - GOX Tanks Ascent Helium Storage  
Ascent Engine - Injector and Combustion Chamber  
Ascent Propellant Tanks  
Bulkhead Feedthrough Connectors  
Burst Disk  
Cable Cutter Explosive Devices  
Circular Connectors  
Coaxial Switches and Connectors  
Coupling Disconnects  
Coupling Test Points  
Data Storage  
Data Entry Display Assembly  
Descent Engine  
Diplexer  
Disconnect  
Disconnect. Flight Half  
Descent Propellant Tanks (LM 6 and later)  
Docking Lights  
End Detonator Cartridges  
Explosive Nut and Bolt Assembly  
Explosive Valves  
Gimbal Drive Actuators

## **CALIFORNIA (contd.)**

Helium Explosive Valves  
Helium Filter  
Helium Pressure Valve  
Helium Quad Check Valve  
Helium Relief Valve  
Helium Valve - Descent Regulator  
High Pressure O2 Control Assembly  
Initiator  
Interstage Disconnect  
Landing Gear Uplock Cutter Assembly  
Latching Valve  
Oxygen Fill Disconnect  
Potentiometer  
Pressure Relief Valve  
Propellant Filter  
Propellant Quantity Measuring Device  
Propellant Solenoid Valve  
Quad Check Valve  
RCS Explosive Cartridge  
Reaction Control Subsystem  
Regulating Valve  
Steam Vent Divider  
Suit Loop Switch  
Supercritical Helium Tanks  
Surge Tank Disconnect  
Transducer  
TTCA Transducer  
Universal Ball Joint

## **NEW YORK (21)**

Ascent Engine - Skirt Bell and Valves  
Caution and Warning Electronic Assembly  
Control Electronic Section  
Exterior Tracking Light  
H2O Bacteria Filter  
Heater Assembly (RCS)  
Helium Filter Aircraft  
Lighting Control Assembly  
Mission Timer  
Panel Overlay  
PLSS Condensate Collector  
Program Reader Assembly  
Propellant Filters  
Propellant Level Detectors  
Propellant Tanks  
Relays  
Sensor Probe  
Signal Conditioning Electronics Assembly  
Waste Management System  
Window Panel Assembly  
Windows

## **MASSACHUSETTS (9)**

Attitude and Translation Control Assembly  
Descent Engine Control Assembly  
Discrete Transducers  
Event Timer  
Landing Radar and Rendezvous Radar Subsystem  
Miniature Switch  
Mission Timer  
Toggle Switch  
Transistors

# Subcontracted LM Components

## **NEW JERSEY (8)**

Communication Subsystem  
Helium Temperature Pressure indicator  
Propellant Quantity indicator  
Range/Altitude Indicator  
Rotary Switch  
Rough Combustion Cutoff  
Solenoid Valve  
Synchros

## **CONNECTICUT (7)**

Caution and Warning  
CO2 Sensor  
Component Caution  
Environmental Control Subsystem  
Inverter  
Pressure Garment Assembly O2 Connectors  
Waveguides

## **MINNESOTA (7)**

Attitude Control Assemblies  
Flag indicators (Talkbacks)  
Pushbutton Switch  
Self-Luminous Devices  
Signal Strength Meters  
Target Assembly  
X (Cross) Pointers

## **MICHIGAN (6)**

Circuit Breakers  
Flight Director Attitude Indicators  
Gimbal Angle Sequencing Transformation Assembly  
Helium Latch Valve  
Relief Valve  
Time Delay

## **OHIO (4)**

Digital Uplink Assembly  
Electroluminescent Lamps  
Interior Floodlight  
Portable Utility Light

## **ARIZONA (3)**

Circuit Interrupter  
Fire-in-The-Hole (FITH) Connector  
Interrupter

## **VIRGINIA (3)**

C-Band Transponder  
Electrical Control Assembly  
RF Signal Sampling Sensor

## **FLORIDA (2)**

Pulse Code Modulation/Timing Electronic Assembly

## **INDIANA (2)**

Descent Propellant Tanks (LM4 and 5)  
Heat Exchanger Discrete

## **MISSOURI (2)**

Ascent and Descent Batteries  
Bacteria Filter

## **VERMONT (2)**

Retractable Cable  
Wire

## **IOWA (1)**

Thrust/Weight Indicator

## **MAINE (1)**

Propellant Quantity Gaging System

## **MARYLAND (1)**

Oxygen Hose

## **NORTH CAROLINA (1)**

Pyro Battery

## **RHODE ISLAND (1)**

Flex Lines

## **TENNESSEE (1)**

Cold Plate Assemblies



# Interface Control Documents

GRUMMAN AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING CORPORATION  
BETHPAGE, L. I., NEW YORK

INTERFACE CONTROL DOCUMENT

THIS DOCUMENT SPECIFIES TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS BETWEEN ALL PARTIES AFFECTED HEREIN. NOTHING CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT SHALL BE DEEMED TO ALTER THE TERMS OF ANY CONTRACT OR PURCHASE ORDER BETWEEN GAEC AND THE ADDRESSEE.

APPROVALS		
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURES	REPRESENTING	DATE
<i>Paul J. Gardner</i>	GAEC	1/8/65
<i>Arnold B. Whitaker</i>	GAEC	1/8/65
	MIT	

PREPARED BY: H. Donnelly/S. Glasser      CHECKED: S. Henderson *S. Henderson* 1/5/65

TITLE: LMC-LM ELECTRICAL INTERFACE

CC# NO.

LM-1, 14-1, 14-1, 14-1, 14-1

EFFECTIVITY

REV. NO. LIE 370-10004

IDRR 38154      JUN 11 1970

INTERFACE CONTROL DOCUMENT

GRUMMAN AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING CORPORATION  
BETHPAGE, L. I., NEW YORK

REVISIONS

REV LTR	IRN NO.	SHEET	DESCRIPTION -- INCLUDE CCA NUMBER	REV. BY	APPROVALS		DATE
					GAEC	MIT	
A	-1	10 25 37	DSKY Dimer Circuit	H. Donnelly	GAEC	<i>[Signature]</i>	
A	-2	20 21 22 23	Pulse Transformer Specification		GAEC	<i>[Signature]</i>	
A	-3	ALL	General Revision and Update		MIT	<i>[Signature]</i>	
A	-4	28 29	Radar Pulse Timing				
A	-5	12 37	ACS Digital Data (Downlink)				
A	-6	6 8 33 34 35	Re-identification of EES Jets				
A	-7	14	IMP Warning (MIT)				
A	-8	11	IMP Warning (GAEC)				
B	A-1	Rev. A Sheet 10 11 12 24 25-28	General Update	J. Henderson	GAEC	<i>[Signature]</i>	12/1/66
B	A-2	22	Throttle Increase/Decrease Commands		MIT	<i>[Signature]</i>	13 Oct 66
B	A-3	1-13 14 20 32 37-39 41 44 45	General Update				

IDRR 38154      JUN 11 1970

INTERFACE CONTROL DOCUMENT

SHEET 2 OF 114	ICD NO. LIE 370-10004	REV. D
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GRUMMAN AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING CORPORATION  
BETHPAGE, L. I., NEW YORK

Introduction

This ICD defines and unless otherwise stated, controls the electrical signal interface between the LM Guidance Computer (LGC), including the DSKY, and LM Spacecraft subsystems. Electrical requirements for the interface through which spacecraft prime power is supplied to the LGC are included for reference only. The controlling document for prime power is LIS-390-10008.

This ICD is divided into sixteen sub-sections. Each sub-section defines particular LGC-LM interfaces with respect to the following:

1. Signal nomenclature
2. Signal/connector/pin assignments
3. Source and load impedance
4. Signal characteristics
5. Interfacing circuitry
6. Functional description

The noise limits referred to for a given interface circuit are those which could be obtained without affecting the proper functioning of the interface. As a general rule, however, the interference emanating from either side of the interface shall not exceed the limits specified in MIL-I-26600/MSC-EMF-10A. The susceptibility of the respective equipments on either side of the interface shall meet the requirements of the same specifications.

The nomenclature used in describing the pulse signal characteristics is defined in appendix A (Sheet 110).

For the purpose of this ICD, a logic "1" denotes that the function or condition specified by the signal nomenclature is being performed. I.e.: A logic "1" for the Auto Angle Track Enable means that the Auto Angle Track function is enabled. Conversely, a logic "0" denotes that the function is not being performed or the condition does not exist.

IDRR 38154      JUN 11 1970


INTERFACE CONTROL DOCUMENT


SHEET 1 OF 114	ICD NO. LIE 370-10004	REV. D
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# PLSS Remote Control Unit





# Risk Management

- Schedule risk vs. safety risk
- Qualitative vs. quantitative
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Critical Items List
  - Criticality 1: Loss of life or vehicle if the component fails
  - Criticality 2: Loss of mission if the component fails
  - Criticality 3: All others
- Exception, Waiver or Retention Rationale
  - Design, Test, Inspection, History, Use

# Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)




Failure Modes and Effects Analysis - LRRR

NO. ATM 86P Rev. NO. A  
PAGE 6 OF 11  
DATE 20 August 1970



Failure Modes and Effects Analysis - LRRR

NO. ATM 868 Rev. A  
PAGE 8 OF 11  
DATE 20 August 1970



\* UHT is implaced in UHT Socket Interface prior to removal of LRRR Dust Cover

\*\* The loss of corners due to environmental stress during transportation to the lunar surface would result in a linear degradation of the return signal to earth. A design safety factor has been included in the Array to preclude the probability of corners fracturing due to environmental stress.

Figure 1 Mission Functions for LRRR

TABLE I (cont)  
SUMMARY OF LRRR FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS

Mission Function	Sym.	Hardware	Statement of Assumed Failure	Seriousness	Probability of Occurrence	Detectable During	Contingencies
Deploy Leveling Leg	F	Pull Pin	Stuck Pin	Significant	Negligible	Functional Tests	In the event astronaut cannot remove pull pin to deploy leveling leg, he should use lunar soil or lunar rock and bubble leveler to deploy LRRR.
		Latching Mechanism	Spring Failure	Significant	Negligible	Functional Tests	In the event of spring failure in latching mechanism, astronaut should use lunar soil or lunar rock and bubble leveler to deploy LRRR.

# Discussion Groups

- Moon Machines video (“The Lunar Module”)
  - An overview of LM development
- Brooks Chapter 6 (“Lunar Module”)
  - The view from NASA, focused on preliminary design
- Kelly Chapter 5 (“Engineering a Miracle”)
  - The view from Grumman, focused on preliminary design
- Lutz Report (“Development of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit”)
  - An “Apollo Experience Report” focused on the spacesuit and PLSS